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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

A. FRED FLEMING,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case

FLEMING FELT COMPANY, a corporation, and JOSEPH H. FELT and
MARIE FELT,

No. 8732

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is unable to agree with the Statement of Facts
as set forth in appellants' brief, and under the recent Utah
Supreme Court decision of Douglas vs. Duvall, 304 P2d, elects
to restate the facts in a manner consistent with the true nature
of the controversy.
Plaintiff was operating an automotive supply business

3
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known as the A. Fred Fleming Supply in Provo, Utah, ~nd had
been engaged in that business since 1949 (R. 57, Exn. 1-P).
In the middle of July, 1953, J. H. Felt contacted A. Fred Fleming and offered to sell him his business in Salt Lake City,
known as the J. H. Felt Motor Supply Company, a Utah corporation, (R. 56).
In substance, Mr. Felt told Fleming that his business could
be bought for $17,000.00 or $18,000.00; that he wanted to
retire and travel with his wife, Marie Felt, and he wanted
someone to manage it and take it over. If Mr. Fleming would
put his merchandise in with the J. H. Felt Motor Supply
Company, Fleming could pay him $200.00 a month for Mr.
Felt's stock (R. 57, 58).
The week following the first contact in Provo, Fleming
came to Salt Lake City and looked over the merchandise of
the J. H. Felt Motor Supply Company and observed that much
of the merchandise was old and obsolete. Fleming called this
to the attention of Mr. Felt, who assured Fleming that he would
be charged only for merchandise that was actually good and
he would not be charged anything for good will (R. 60).
Fleming, after thinking over the proposition made by Mr.
Felt, moved his merchandise and business, valued at $13,511.52,
from Provo to Salt Lake City, on September 1, 1953. At that
time, Fleming commenced doing business with the Felts jointly,
and Fleming received 13,512 shares of stock in the new corporation known as the Fleming-Felt Company (R. 62). The
Felts received 25,234 shares of stock in the new corporation,
with J. H. Felt as president and Marie Felt as secretarytreasurer (Exh. 1-P).

4.
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L<J.wrence McKay, at the suggestion of Mr. Felt, was to
draft a11 agre':!ment covering the sale. A written agreement was
submitted to Fleming six weeks after he had moved to Salt
Lake City, but it was not drafted according to the terms discussed between Fleming and Mr. Felt (R. 61, 62). Fleming,
who was not represented by an attorney, objected to the price
set forth in the contract, the forfeiture provision and conditions under which his office as general manager could be terminated (R. 61).
Fleming also objected to the second and third drafts of
the contract and finally signed the agreement after becoming
so involved from operating together nearly three months (R.
58, 105). At the time this contract was signed, Mr. Felt made
the representation that Fleming was not charged for obsolete
merchandise; that Mr. Felt's position as president of the new
Fleming-Felt Company was just an honorary position; that
Fleming would be the general manager and have the full
management of business (R. 59) ; that the forfeiture provisions were legal terms that had to be in the contract and no
court would enforce such a provision (R. 61), and upon the
further representation by Mrs. Felt that she was not in the
business because she wanted to be and that she was certainly
going to retire when Mr. Felt retired (R. 67). Fleming, relying
upon these representations (R. 63, 66), signed the contract.
He did not see a copy of the complete inventory, Exh. 4-P,
with prices of the J. H. Felt Motor Supply Company until
February 11, 1955 (R. 62, 76) and had previously accepted
it in good faith.
Eight or nine months later when Fleming had become

5
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acquainted with the business, he proposed a change in the bookkeeping system in order to obtain a financial statement more
often than once a year. As secretary and treasurer, Mrs. Felt
as well as Mr. Felt, objected to a change in the bookkeeping
system and refused to make any material change (R. 67, 68).

/~··
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Mr. Felt was in charge of delivery service, which was very
poor, and Fleming requested that this service be improved
and Mr. Felt objected to, and refused to make, any change
in the delivery service (R. 69). Fleming proposed that much
of the merchandise of the company, which was not being sold,
be reduced in price in order to move it and provide operating
capital to obtain new stock. Mr. Felt told him that "If a person
wants to buy that, they will pay full price for it" (R. 69).
The Felts also refused to initiate Fleming's policy of giving
a 2% discount on bills paid before the lOth of each month
(R. 171, 172).
After these changes had been proposed, the Felts invited
Mr. and Mrs. Fleming to their home for dinner in January of
1955. When the table was cleared Mr. Felt produced a financial
statement which he had prepared without taking an inventory
of the merchandise and said, "We are losing monef.:' (R. 70).
When Fleming didn't accept the report, Mr. ~1!wieg took a
resolution from his pocket and announced that this was a
Board of Directors meeting and read the resolution which
stated as follows: "Be it resolved that Fred Fleming, being
a good salesman, shall be sales manager and shall buy as he
i~ presently doing; that Marie Felt be financial manager and
that he, Joseph Felt, would run the store" (R. 71).
Shortly after the above meeting, Fleming posted a notice

6
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in the office of the company outlining the duties of the general
manager prepared by an attorney, Mr. Ralph (R. 122). After
it was there for a few days Mr. Felt ripped it down (R. 71),
and Fleming told Mr. Felt at this time that things were so
unbearable that one of them would have to leave the business.
Fleming offered to leave upon the condition that he receive his
merchandise from the company. Felt, however, decided to go.
The next morning Fleming fired Mrs. Felt for incompetency
(R. 73, 74), and she requested that she be permitted to work
until about the first part of March, 1955 (R. 74).
On May 23, 195 5, the Board of Directors of the FlemingFelt Company, composed of Joseph H. Felt, Harold B. Felt,
A. Fred Fleming, LaFaun J. Fleming and Marie Felt, with the
Flemings voting in the negative, passed a motion rehiring
Marie Felt at a salary of $400.00 per month, after a competent
bookkeeper had been hired by Fleming at $200.00 per month
(R. 74, 75, Exh. 15-D, Page 9). Fleming's authority to sign
checks was also restricted by the Board of Directors at this
May 23rd meeting (Exh. 15-D).
The Board of Directors on May 23, 1955, with the Flemings voting in the negative, also passed by-laws which gave the
general control and charge of the affairs of the Fleming-Felt
Corporation to the president of the company, J. H. Felt (R.
71, Exh. P-2, Art. III, Paragraph 2), contrary to the contract.
On June 1, 1955, Fleming mailed a check to the Felts for
$200.00 to apply on the purchase of the Felts' stock in the
Fleming-Felt Company. The check was returned with no explanation and on June 8, 1955, Fleming tendered $200.00 in
cash to the Felts which they refused to accept (R. 75, 109, 184).
7
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Being unable to operate as general manager, Fleming left the
business (R. 75, 76) and tendered back the 13,512 shares of
stock in the Fleming-Felt Company endorsed in blank and
requested a rescission of the contract and a return of $13,512.00
or stock of that value on July 26, 1955 (R. 107, 129, 130). Also,
on July 26, 1955, Fleming offered to return the certificates,
owned by Joseph H. Felt and Marie Felt, which he held (R.
130, 185).
From the latter part of February, 1955 (R. 78, 79), until
July 26, 1955, negotiations for settlement of the dispute were
attempted (R. 76, 79, 80, 110, Exh. 15-D, Page 8). Fleming
offered Felt $5,000.00 payment to apply on the purchase of the
business after June 8, 1955, and before suit was filed (R. 109)
and it was refused.

:~ -

POINTS RELIED UPON
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESCINDED THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS BElNG INEQUITABLE AND ILLEGAL AND DID NOT
MISCONSTRUE THE SAME IN ANY MATERIAL ASPECT.

II. THE FINDING OF FACT NO.8 IS REASONABLY
SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE.
III. FLEMING WAS NOT BARRED ON THE
GROUNDS OF LACHES, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL FROM
SEEKING A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 7 AND 11 ARE REASONABLY SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND LEND
SUPPORT TO THE JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION.
8
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V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A
MONEY JUDGMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RESCINDED THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS BEING INEQUITABLE AND ILLEGAL AND DID NOT
MISCONSTRUE THE SAME IN ANY MATERIAL ASPECT.
The defendants ask in their brief wherein the contract is
illegal. It is well established law that a contract founded in
fraud is illegal, as stated in the case of Goodrich vs. Tenney,
144 Ill. 422, 33 N.E. 44, as follows:
"Contracts are illegal when founded upon a consideration contra bones mores, against the principals
of sound public policy, in fraud or in contravention of
the provision of some statute."
A contract which is invalid, as set forth in Black's Law
Dictionary, page 1005, is:

"Vain; inadequate to its purpose; not of binding
force or legal efficacy; lacking in authority or obligation."
The following authorities are to the same effect:
State vs. American Surety Company (Idaho), 145 P. 1097

at Page 1104:
"The word illegal means unlawfully and contrary
to law."
Bretz vs. El Reno State Bank (Okla.) 177 P. 362:

9
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''The term 'illegal' in its common acceptation signifies
t?at which is contrary to the principals of law as distinguished from Rules of Procedure."
"Any agreement to wrong or defraud a third person
or an agreement which involves a fraud on the rights
of oth~rs .or which has an obvious tendency to encourage
fraud 1s 1llegal because it is contrary to public policy."
12 Am. Jur., page 677, Section 178.
"There is no principal in the law better settled than
th~t whate~er has an obviou~ te~dency to encourage

guilty neghgence, fraud or crune 1s contrary to public
policy." Maxwell Operating Co. vs. Harper, L.R.A.
1918C, Page 673.

Contrary to statements in defendants' brief (Page 6)
plaintiff alleged false and fraudulent representations that induced him to enter into the contract (R. 3, 4, 5) and such was
argued at the trial of this matter and considered by the court
in making its decision.
The court, in characterizing the contract as unilateral and
inequitable, obviously was concerned about its one-sided nature;
unilateral being so defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Page
1781. This meaning is also evident from the Conclusion of
Law No. 1, which states: "That the contract between the Felts
and Fleming is unilateral, inequitable and unenforceable by
Fleming against the Felts, but grants the Felts complete power
to dominate and terminate the contract as against Fleming" (R.

273).
Close examination and analysis of the contract and the
evidence shows the court was completely justified in its conclusion that the contract was founded in fraud, one-sided,
inequitable and illegal.
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fleming was to receive the right to be general manager.
However, the Board of Directors of the Fleming-Felt Company would always be under the control of the Felts as majority
stockholders (Exh. 1-P, R. 64), and the Felts used their power
on the Board of Directors to limit plaintiff's authority to that
of a mere salesman for the Company. This is evident by action
taken at the Board of Directors meeting on May 23, 1955,
rehiring Marie Felt at $400.00 per month, after she had been
discharged by Mr. Fleming (Exh. 15-D Page 9).
The power, control and intent of the Felts were also manifested at the so-called Board of Directors meeting in January,
1955, when Fleming was discharged for no valid reason as
"general manager" and given the duties of "sales manager"
(R. 70, 71).
The contract contained a provision whereby if Fleming
failed to make a profit for any two consecutive years he could
be discharged as general manager. In opposing Mr. Fleming as
general manager it is obvious that the Felts were anxious to
have him breach that provision of the contract, which by their
power and control they could accomplish, thereby giving them
the right to terminate his duties as general manager. There is
no question but what the Felts had complete power to dominate
and terminate the contract as against Fleming.
By the procedure of Marie Felt making checks out for bills
of the company before they were to be paid (Exh. 15-P Page 5)
and Mr. Felt estimating the inventory (R. 131, 70) they attempted to convince Fleming by financial statements, based
upon that procedure that he was not making a profit in the
business, as required under the contract. The dinner meeting
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in January, 1955 (R. 70) and the meeting April 1, 1955, were
called for that very purpose (Exh. 15-D Page 5).
Fleming was to receive the right to purchase the shares
of stock owned by the Felts; yet, under the contract, the Felts
were to receive for their services, and did receive, the same
amount of money per month as Fleming was paid, so long as
the Felts were hired by the company, which the Felts could
insist upon, and did insist upon, through the Board of Directors
which they controlled (Exh. 15-D Page 9}. When neither
of the Felts was hired by the company, Fleming was obligated,
whether he was still general manager or not, to proceed with
the purchase of the stock, and until the sales price of $33,269.00
with interest was paid in full, legal title to the stock remained
with the Felts and they would receive all the dividends, have
all the voting privileges and right that could exist in or by the
ownership of the stock, except the right to sell or hypothecate
the same ( Exh. I-P, Par. 3) . Since the Board of Directors,
under the control of the Felts, could insist, and did insist on
one of them being employed by the corporation, Fleming, in
all probability, could not buy Felts' stock so long as they were
living.
The court, in stating that it would take Fleming about
24 years to pay for the stock in Finding No. 4, was obviously
figuring it at $200.00 per month. However, the point the court
was emphasizing was that ownership and voting rights of the
stock would remain with the Felts until the complete purchase
price was paid and that is what the balance of Finding No. 4
states (R. 271), thus giving the Felts complete control over
Fleming until the last dollar was paid.
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Defendants' argue in their brief that even though the Felts
were hired by the company, Fleming could make payments on
the purchase price and that the court has misinterpreted the
contract in this respect. Counsel for defendants argued at the
trial that the tender of $200.00 on the purchase price was
premature because Fleming could not make payments on the
purchase price until the Felts were no longer employed by
the corporation. The court apparently believed that the individual drafting the document would be in the best position
to know what was intended by the language of the contract
and, ,therefore, adopted the interpretation placed upon it by
counsel for the defendants. As long as the Felts received the
same salary as Fleming, he would hardly be in a position to
make any payments on the purchase price, and the fact that
defendants refused plaintiff's tender of $200.00 and $5,000.00
in June and July of 1955 (R. 75, 109) is a good indication that
payments could not be made while the Felts were employed
by the company. If payments could be made while the Felts
were still employed, then, the contract was breached by the
Felts' refusal of the tenders.
At most, plaintiff only had the right to purchase the Felts'
stock at some extreme! y indefinite date in the future after he
had paid the Felts $400.00 per month until their death and
during a period when both of them should have been in retirement.
The contract also contained a very harsh and inequitable
forfeiture provision to the effect that if Fleming failed to make
any payments under the contract, the Felts could terminate
the contract and Fleming would forfeit all that had been paid,
namely, $13,512.00, plus any additional payments.
13
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Defendants claim the court used contradictory language
in Finding No. 6 (R. 271, 272). They, however, only quoted
a portion of it in their brief. Reading the finding in its entirety
it becomes evident that in the court's opinion, the only thing
that Fleming could get out of the contract was the right to
be general manager, which was worthless since, as stated in
the balance of the finding, ·'The Board of Directors would
always be under the control of the Felts," and they could,
therefore, ultimately control the general manager and make
Fleming their puppet.

.

The unfairness of the contract is a factor from which
fraud can be inferred, especially when taken along with the
false representations made to induce the contract, as set forth
in 24 Am. Jur. Page 93, 94, Section 260, as follows:
·'The fact that one in whom confidence is reposed by
another obtains an apparent advantage over the latter
in the transaction between them is a motivating factor
in raising the presumption of fraud on the part of a
fiduciary. Moreover, the unfairness of a transaction
or the inadequacy of consideration is in itself a factor
from which fraud can be inferred and such inference
will operate along with other evidence to support a
finding of fraud. . . . There may be contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on their face as to raise
the presumption of fraud in their inception, or, at
least, to require only a slight additional evidence to
justify such a presumption. A presumption of fraud
may also arise from unusual provisions in an instrument,
whereby the draftsman of the instrument has obtained
an advantage over the other party, or from a great
deficiency in the quantity of real or personal property
sold or from the failure of a party charged with fraud
to appear and explain or to introduce testimony."
14
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Even if fraud had not been pleaded the illegality could be
considered by the court as set forth in the following citation:
"Were the matter showing the illegality of an agreement appearing on the face of the pleading counting
on it, its illegality is a question to be dealt with by
the trial court without formal plea of facts showing
its illegality. If plaintiff, in order to make out his cause
of action, is required to show that the agreement sued
upon is for any reason illegal the court should not enforce it regardless of whether the illegality has been
pleaded." 12 Am. Jur., Page 742, Section 223. See also
to the same effect Kennedy vs. Lonabaugh (Wyo.)
117 P. 1079.
The contract was unilateral, namely one-sided; extremely
unfair, founded in fraud, inequitable and illegal.

POINT NO. II
THE FINDING OF FACT NO. 8 IS REASONABLY
SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Appellants cite numerous authorities to the effect that
fraud as a general rule must relate to a present or pre-existing
fact and they claim that the representations made by Mr. and
Mrs. Felt are representations of an intention or expectation.
A generally recognized rule of law is that a man's intent or
state of mind is a fact which may be proved, and if shown to
be falsely represented may form a foundation for actionable
fraud.
Hull vs. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P2d 56, quotes with
approval from Ruling Case Laws, as follows:

15
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·· ... the intention to deceive is a condition of mind,
which, when it exists, is as much a fact as a condition
of the body, notwithstanding that it is more difficult
to prove; . . . therefore, a misstatement of a man's
mind is a misstatement of fact." See also to the same
effect State vs. Bruce (Utah) 262 P2d 962.
The following citations from American Jurisprudence are
to the same effect:
"The weight of authority holds that if the falsity of
the statement can be established, a misrepresentation
of intent is an actionable representation of fact. A
statement by a speaker as to what he intends to do
may import a statement of fact, that is, as to his present
intention; and if his expressed intention is merely
feigned in order to mislead, a charge of fraud may be
predicated thereon ... fraud may in the majority of
jurisdictions, be predicated on the non-performance
of a promise in certain cases where the promise is the
device to accomplish the fraud, the most frequent
example of such a fraudulent promise being a promise
made without any intention of performing it at the
time of making it, or where a relation of trust and
confidence exists between the parties. If through inducements held out by one person even by means of
a promise alone, another is influenced to change his
position so that he cannot be placed in statu quo and
will be seriously damaged unless the promise is fulfilled, the refusal to perform has frequently been held
to constitute fraud." 23 Am. Jur. Page 804-806, Sec.
41, citing Hull vs. Flinders (Utah), 27 P2d 56. See
also to the same effect Kritzer vs. Moffet (Wash.) 240
p 355.
"A majority of American courts hold that fraud
may be predicated on promises made with a present
intention not to perform them or as the rule is frequently expressed on promises made without an in16
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tention of performance, and that for such fraudulent
promise, relief may be had in equity or law, as the
circumstances and issues presented demand. Recourse
may therefore be had for such promise, made for the
purpose of deceiving the promisee and inducing him
to act where otherwise he would not do so, in such a
way as to affect his legal right or to alter his position
to his injury or risk, as by making and entering into
disadvantageous contracts or in some way giving over,
transferring, or surrendering real or personal property
or rights therein to the person who makes the fraudulent promise." 23 Am. Jur. Page 885, Section 106,
citing Hull vs. Flinders (Utah) 27 P2d 56.
Where parties are on unequal footing or confidential relationship exists, as in the instant case, the ordinary rules with
respect to inability to predicate fraud on promises or statements
with regards to future events have been somewhat modified
as shown by the following:
·'Where the parties to a transaction are not on an
equal footing, but one of them has, or is in a position
where he should have superior and accurate knowledge
concerning the matters to which his statements relate,
or the parties occupy a trust or confidential relationship, the ordinary rules with respect to inability to
predicate fraud on promises or statements with regard
to future events have been somewhat modified. Thus,
it has been held that where the parties do not stand
on an equal footing, but one of them is in a position
where he relies and is justified on relying on the other's
opinion, the rule that representations made during the
negotiations of a contract which are not statements of
existing fact but prophesies of things to come, do not
constitute actionable representations, is inapplicable,
that the rule that a forecast of what will happen in the
future is merely promissory, and not a statement of
existing fact, does not apply, where the matter involved
17
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is peculiarly within the speaker's knowledge."
A.L.R. 81.

51

A confidential relationship as above set forth applies to
persons jointly entering into a business enterprise and is not
limited to relations held fiduciary as a matter of law, as set
forth in 37 C.J.S. Page 282, Section 35, as follows:
"The same principles are applicable to persons jointly
entering into a business enterprise, such as joint purchasers, who are liable for inducing their co-purchasers
to pay more than a fair share by misrepresenting the
purchase price or the original cost, or persons associated in business as partners, or officers, directors,
and stockholders of the same corporation."
The following citations set forth the method of proving
an intent not to perform the promises or statements at the time
they were made:
"The correct rule, however, appears to be that, while
the mere fact of failure or refusal to perform an oral
agreement is not sufficient of itself to raise the issue
of fraud, yet it is entitled to consideration for this purpose along with such other relevant facts and circumstances as may be shown and the weight to be attached
to the subsequent conduct of the promisor in failing
or refusing to perform the promise would appear to
depend on the particular circumstances, such failure
or refusal being under some conditions strong evidence
of an intent not to perform the promise at the time it
was made, as, where the time which elapses between
the making of the promise and the refusal ·to perform
it is inconsequential and there is no change in circumstances, or the promisor does not make even a pretense
of performance .... a person's intent within the meaning of the rule relating to fraudulent promises made
without intention of performance, is often a difficult
18
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matter to determine, and evidence of subsequent conduct and speech on the part of the promisor may be
resorted to for the purpose of showing fraudulent intent, which may be shown by such evidence as matter
of inference, although there is no direct evidence of
a pre-conceived, secret intention on the part of the
promisor at the time of making the promise not to be
performed." 51 A.L.R. 164.
"The view has been taken that the jury may find that
the promisor, at the time he made the promise, had
no intention of performance, so as to establish fraud,
from the fact that thereafter the promisor did not even
make a pretense of complying with the contract.
Chicago T. & M.C.R. Co. vs. Titterington (Tex.) 19
s.w. 472.
"It is not essential that direct evidence of fraud be
adduced; circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
establish it, and fraud may be proved by evidence wholly
circumstantial, or by a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, and where in the fact of inferences so strong as to make out a prima facia case
of fraud defendant remains silent, plaintiff should
recover." 37 C.J.S. Page 436, Sec. 115.
"And it has been held that if one asserts as a fact
that he is about to do something, and thereby induces
another to enter into contractual relations with him
and such other party will be injured by the non-performance of the representations, the representor cannot
avoid cancellation of the contract on the ground that
the representations were mere matters of opinion; and
even an actual fraudulent intent does not appear to be
essential under this view, but may, it seems, be inferred
or conclusively presumed." 51 A.L.R. 69.
"Equity courts will act on circumstances, as presumptions of fraud, where courts of law would not
deem them satisfactory proof. A transaction may be in19
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trinsically so unconscionable as in the absence of explanation to furnish its own intrinsic proof of fraud. It
has been said that the jurisdiction of courts of equity
to relieve against active and effective fraud is so essential to the administration of justice therein that such
courts will often, indeed, take hold of a twig or twinethread to up-hold it." 19 Am Jur. Page 67, Sec. 43. See
also to the same effect Sullivan vs. Murphy (Iowa), 232
N.W. 267. Emphasis supplied in foregoing citations.

In view of the above authorities let us consider the evidence
showing the falsity or intent to deceive on the part of J. H.
Felt and Marie Felt.
The knowledge of whether Mr. and Mrs. Felt would
retire and give Fleming the full management of the business
and whether Felt's position as president was honorary, were
exclusively within the Felts' knowledge.
There is no question but what Mr. and Mrs. Felt made
the representations alleged and testified to by Fleming as they
are not contradicted.
In the middle of July, Mr. Felt told Fleming he could
buy the business for $17,000.00 or $18,000.00 (R. 57); that
Fleming would be general manager and have the full management of the business (R. 59). Six weeks later after Fleming
had moved from Provo, put his merchandise in the new corporation, the contract prepared by defendants' attorney was
presented to Fleming (R. 61, 62), and under its terms the
price of Felts' business had been nearly doubled (Exh. 1-P).
The new corporation was set up with J. H. Felt as president
and Marie Felt as secretary and treasurer (Exh. 1-P), and the
Felts with the majority on the Board of Directors, giving
20
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them the control of the corportion (Exh. 15-D); which gives
the inference, because of the short lapse of time after Felt
made the representations, that Mr. Felt never had any intention
to retire or sell his business for $17,000.00 or $18,000.00. No
provision was put in the contract about the Felts' retirement,
giving the inference that their expressed intention of retirement
was false. Mr. Felt also made the statement at the Board of
Directors meeting April 1, 1955, that the contract was not
valid because it wasn't accepted (R. 64). He was obviously
referring to the resolution of the Board of Directors on November 6, 1953, which authorized the new Fleming-Felt Company to enter into a contract with Fleming and to permit
Fleming to act as ge_neral manager only so long as he did not
show a loss, contrary to the contract which requires him not to
show a loss in two consecutive years (Exh. 15-D, Page 3).
At the time the contract was signed, approximately three
months after Fleming moved his business from Provo, Mrs.
Felt stated she would retire when Mr. Felt did (R. 61), which
was never contradicted by Mrs. Felt.
Mr. Felt at the time the contract was signed (R. 67)
represented that his position as president was only honorary
(R. 59) which was a statement of an existing fact. Mr. Felt
also stated again at the signing of the contract that Fleming
would have full management of the business (R. 59).
As soon as Fleming tried to assert his office as general
manager he was opposed by the Felts (R. 68, 69). In January
of 1955, Mr. Fleming was discharged as general manager on
the pretense that the company was losing money (R. 70, 71).
21
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The foregoing circumstances raise the inference that the
Felts never intended at anytime to release the actual control
or management of the new company, although the Felts had
let Fleming assume the mere title of general manager. The
inference seems clear that Mr. Felt wanted a salesman, not a
general manager.
Fleming posted a notice of his duties as general manager;
Mr. Felt ripped it down (R. 71). On May 23, 1955, the Felts,
with the control of the Board of Directors, passed by-laws transferring the office of general manager to the president of the
company, J. H. Felt (R. 71, Exh. P-2). Fleming fired Mrs.
Felt and the Board of Directors rehired her (R. 74, 75, Exh.
15-D). Plaintiff's tenders to buy the business from the Felts
were refused (R. 75) and the Felts refused to rescind the
contract (R. 107, 129). These circumstances show that the
statements and promises were unfulfilled and the contract
breached in every material aspect by the Felts and there was no
pretense or intent of performance by the Felts. As indicated
above, all the Felts wanted was a salesman who would buy the
Felts' shares of stock in the Fleming-Felt Company, upon their
death or at some future time at the option of J. H. Felt and
Marie Felt or the survivor.
In view of the foregoing circumstances it is reasonable
to infer that the representations of the Felts were false when
made with no intent of performance.
Concerning the question of when Mr. Felt would retire,
i.e., when Fleming became acquainted with the business, it
would be expected that Felt would retire within a reasonable
time and since Fleming had been engaged in the automotive
22
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parts business since 1949, that time could not reasonably be
expected to be more than 8 or 9 months at the most. Felt also
stated in July of 1953 he had come to the point he wanted to
retire (R. 58), thus indicating it would be soon.
The falsity of the representations as to Fleming being
general manager, Mr. Felt's position as president being honorary, and as to the Felts' retirement, were within the exclusive
knowledge of the Felts, and plaintiff certainly had a right to
rely on them, since by no means of investigation could Fleming
determine they were false when made. Fleming testified that
he did in good faith rely on the representations made by the
Felts (R. 62, 66).
Fleming testified he never had any previous experience
in corporations prior to this deal, i.e. September 1, 1953 (R.
64). He, therefore, would not understand the ultimate control
of the Board of Directors and the disadvantageous position
he was being placed in, and because of the confidential relationship between the parties he would have a right to rely on the
Felts' statements.
When a confidential relationship exists between the parties
representee has a right to rely. See 23 Am. Jur. Page 966,
Sec. 159.
Plaintiff was not relying on any one allegation any more
than any other as a basis for his cause of action, such statements
are unfounded suppositions of appellants.
In Benson vs. Hamilton, (Cal. 1932) 14 P2d 876, it was
held that in an action predicted on fraud consisting in a promise made without intention to perform, the essence of the fraud
23
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is the existence of an intent at the time the promise was made
not to perform it, and under this view the existence of such
intent is always a question of fact, a finding on which, upon
conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.

POINT NO. III
FLEMING WAS NOT BARRED ON THE GROUNDS
OF LACHES, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL FROM SEEKING
A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
Lapse of time alone does not constitute laches:

"If prejudice will not be occasioned to the defendant
as a result of the assertion of the complainant's right,
laches is not predicable of delay attending the commencement of the suit. There is no basis for a contention that the complainant has been guilty of laches
where the rights of third persons are not involved and
the situation of the defendant has not been materially
changed by reason of the complainant's delay in asserting his rights." 19 Am. Jur. Page 353, Sec. 509.
The above rule is followed in Utah and is stated as follows
in Mawhinney vs. Jensen, (Utah 1951) 232 P2d 769:
''The equitable doctrine of laches is founded upon
considerations of time and injury. Laches in legal significance is not mere delay but delay that works a disadvantage to another." Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Edition, Sec. 1442; Chase vs. Chase, 20 R.I.
202, 37 A. 804.
There have been no intervening rights of third parties
in the present case and no injury or detriment to the defendants
since discovery of the fraud.
24
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The elements of an estoppel as related to the party claiming the estoppel are as follows:
( 1) "Lack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question;

(2) Reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped;
and
( 3) Action based thereon of such a character as to
change his position prejudicially." 19 Am. Jur. Page
643, Sec. 42.
The following authorities are to the same effect:
"Estoppel rests largley upon injury or prejudice to
the rights of him who asserts it. Since the function and
purpose of the doctrine are the prevention of fraud
and injustice, there can be no estoppel where there is
no loss, injury, damage, or prejudice to the party claiming it. Moreover, the injury or prejudice involved must
be actual and substantial and not merely technical or
formal." 19 Am. Jur. Page 735, Sec. 85.
"The doctrine of estoppel had no application; the
defendant was not induced to do anything to his harm
by the words or conduct of the plaintiff. Doujotos vs.
Leventhal (Mass.) 171 N.E. 445.
Register tJS. Carmichael (Ala.), 53 So. 800, was cited with
approval in Utah Bond and Share Co. vs. Chappel (Utah) 251
P. 354 at Page 358, as follows:

"The party against whom the estoppel is pleaded must
have received some benefit under the election."
Waiver is defined as follows:
"A waiver is a voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of known right. Unless it is
under seal or arises from conduct creating an estoppel,
25
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it must be supported by an agreement founded upon a
valid consideration." 19 Am. Jur. Page 636, Sec. 36.
Appellants claim that Fleming, by his conduct to assert
his prerogatives as general manager, continuing to dra·v1 his
salary and demanding his rights to purchase the Felt stock
up to June 8, 1955, had waived any cause for rescission up to
that time.
Respondent submits that Fleming was never successful in
asserting his prerogatives as general manager. When he tried
to make changes for the good of the company, he was opposed
(R. 68-71). For trying to assert his rights under the contract
his office as general manager was transferred to the president,
Joseph H. Felt (R. 71, Exh. P-2).
Appellants never relied upon the conduct of Fleming or
changed their position prejudicially. They nullified any attempt
on the part of Fleming to assert his rights, and denied him the
benefit of being general manager.
Likewise, Fleming's tenders to purchase the Felts' stock
were refused and appellants didn't rely upon or change their
position because of Fleming's tenders (R. 75, 109). Neither
did Fleming materially benefit in attempting to assert his
rights under the contract.
As to receiving his salary for his services, he cannot be
held to be estopped, as shown by the following citations:
"There are a number of limitations under the general
rule of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits, and the
mere fact that something more or less beneficial has
come to a person as a direct or indirect result of some
contract, statute, or transaction does not necessarily
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always create an estoppel against him. As indicated in
the preceding section, estoppel does not ordinarily
arise from the acceptance of benefits where such acceptance is induced by excuseable ignorance or mistake
as to the facts involved or where the acceptance is not
inconsistent with the position subsequently taken. One
cannot be estopped by reason of accepting that which
he is legally entitled to receive in any event." 19 Am.
Jur. Page 690, Sec. 65.
"Where money is paid or services are rendered under
a contract which is merely unenforceable, as in cases
under the statute of frauds, an implied assumpsit lies
for the money paid or the value of the services rendered." 12 Am. Jur., 724, Sec. 213.
"As a general proposition, it is no doubt true that
the defense of illegality available to a party cannot
be waived. The doctrine of estoppel by conduct or by
laches has no applicaton to an agreement or instrument which is illegal because it violates an express
mandate of the law or the dictates of public policy.
Neither action or inaction of a party to such an agreement can validate it; and no conduct of a party to
it can be invoked as an estoppel against asserting its
invalidity. Neither party to an agreement against public policy is estopped from questioning it because the
other has parted with property or rendered services
in reliance upon it, although there is some authority
to the contrary." 12 Am. Jur. Page 741, Sec. 222. See
also to the same effect Standard Furniture Co. vs. Van
Alsteen (Wash.) 62 P. 145.
Certainly respondent is legally entitled to compensation
for his services and is entitled to it even though the contract
is invalid. In addition, the appellants have received the same
salary and benefits as Fleming. His salary is not something that
should be returned on rescission of the contract or something
27
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he is receiving for no value, and, therefore, does not prevent
rescission.
The case of Frailey vs. McGarry, 116 (Utah) 504, 211
P2d 840 ( 1949), which appellants claim has parallel facts to
the instant case, is distinguishable. In the Frailey case the falsity
of the statements were made known to the defendant many
months before he decided to rescind the contract.
In the instant case Fleming in February or March of 1955,
as soon as he had any indication that he could not assert his
rights as general manager and that he had been charged with
obsolete merchandise, offered to leave the business, provided
he got his merchandise out of the company; thus announcing
his intention to rescind (R. 73, 74, 78, 79). Mr. Felt decided to
leave instead (R. 73, 74), thus creating the impression that
the contract might be performed at least in the aspect of
Fleming being the general manager. Mr. Felt also promised to
reduce the price of his stock on the J. H. Felt Motor Supply
Company inventory following the payment of all but $1,000.00
as a result of settlement negotiations (R. 80) . The Board of
Directors rehired Marie Felt as secretary-treasurer and transferred the duties of general manager to J. H. Felt shortly
thereafter, thus showing there was a false impression of performance previously given by the Felts (R. 71, 74, 75, Exh.
P-2, Art 3, Par. 2). This action was taken on May 23, 1955,
and on June 1 and 8 of 1955, plaintiff's tenders to purchase
the Felts' interest were refused. Plaintiff announced he was
leaving the business (R. 75, 76) and appellants again at that
time requested a meeting to talk settlement (R. 76). Thereafter, plaintiff offered $5,000.00 on the purchase price which
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appellants didn't accept, and on July 26, 1955, plaintiff tendered
defendants' stock and requested a rescission of the contract
and filed suit for rescission.
As previously argued, none of these attempts by Fleming to
assert his rights caused the defendants to change their position
to their detriment or give the plaintiff any benefit he was not
legally entitled to.
Fleming became fully aware of the fraud, on or about
June 8, 1955.
"Unsuccessful negotiations looking toward performance can hardly be considered inconsistent with a continuing right of rescission, and if a seller induces a
buyer to retain defective goods for a further trial, a
prompt manifestation of election after such further
trial is sufficient. Where promptness of rescission is
required, it would seem the facts of each case should
be considered by the jury to determine whether there
has been unreasonable delay." Wiliston on Contracts,
Page 4111, Sec. 1469.
From February, 1955, to July 26, 1955, negotiations for
settlement were attempted in the instant case (R. 76, 79, 80,
109, Exh. 15-D, Page 8), and are cause for extending delay
in rescinding.
In the Frailey case there was a prior breach by the plaintiff
in failing to pay the taxes, and there is no prior breach on the
part of the plaintiff in the instant case. When Frailey finally
decided to rescind he still maintained the right to retain the
benefits under the contract, i.e., the water rights. Fleming
tendered everything he received under the contract except his
salary earned which he was legally entitled to. The Frailey case
also stands for the following proposition at Page 845:
29
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"As I understand the prevailing opinion, it is not in
any way contrary to this view that considerable time
might be accorded to exercise an election to rescind in
cases such as this where the grounds of rescission may
not be so clear and where the election may depend
upon reducing to a reasonable certainty some of the contingencies which may be in the path of rescission."
When Fleming's grounds for rescission became clear, he
announced the decision and adhered to it.
In the LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 (Utah) 260, 109 P. 2,
cited by appellants, Whitehouse continued to accept payments
on the contract for 11 months after they became fully aware
of the fraud.
After Fleming became sure of his grounds for rescission
in June of 1955, he never accepted any further salary which
he was legally entitled to up until that time.

I

]f'i

Defendants claim by Exh. 12-P that the business was losing
money. Mr. Owen Sumsion, a certified public accountant, stated
that $2,800.00 for obsolete items was taken out of the ending
inventory of February 28, 195 5 (R. 188), and that it was an
estimated inventory not based upon verification (R. 191). The
balance sheet (Exh. 12-P) was simply based upon arbitrary
computations and are not competent evidences to show a loss
( R. 131, 19 5), and counsel for defendants so stated (R. 195).
As to the time the duties of general manager were posted
by Fleming in the company's offices, Fleming denied that he
said, "I am the most surprised man in the world. I thought you
folks would blow up and fire me as general manager. Then I
was going to sue you for breach of contract" (R. 262). On
30
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cross-examination Mrs. Felt reversed her testimony in this respect, as is shown by the following excerpts from her testimony:

Q. "Now can you tell me that actually Mr. Fleming
at that time said that 'I expected you to sue me for
breach of contract for putting that thing up there.' Can
you look me in the eye and say he actually said that?"

(R. 238).
A. "I certainly can; that is exactly what he said the
night that-the night of the day it was posted.'' (R.

238).
Certainly the tender of $200.00 on June 8, 195 5, was
refused unequivocally. The $200.00 check on the first of June
was sent back with no explanation whatsoever (R. 75). Consistent therewith, 8 days later, after appellants had plenty of
time to consult with their attorney concerning the first tender,
they refused the tender of $200.00 cash (R. 75). Russell
Weaver testified as follows:

Q. "What did Mr. Felt say when he tendered that
money?"
A. "He just refused it.''
J. " ... Would you state just what Mr. Felt said,
Mr. Weaver.''
A. "As I remember his words, he said: 'I cannot
take that; I cannot take it.' " (R. 184).
Fleming's testimony was that there was an out-right refusal
of the money and not until he returned the keys and the cash
of the corporation and announced he was leaving the business
did Felt request that he go with him to see an attorney (R. 75,
76).
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Since it was contended at the trial by the appellants that
no payment could be made on the Felts' stock as long as either
of the Felts was hired by the corporation and the tenders
were premature, we can assume that there was an unequivocal
refusal under this view of the contract.

·:-:

Defendants claim that a mere refusal of $200.00 payment
would not warrant rescission. However, we have more than
that. Anything under a $10,000.00 payment was unacceptable
to the Felts, and Mr. Felt refused a $5,000.00 payment on the
purchase price (R. 109, 110). Defendants had already refused
to perform on the only other material aspect of the contract,
i.e., permitting Fleming to assert his rights as general manager.
Therefore, we have a material breach and repudiation of the
contract by defendants, which would justify a rescission.

···

Defendants now set up estoppel and waiver, and yet the'
did not plead waiver and estoppel or argue it at the trial.
These are affirmative defenses which must be pleaded under
Rule 8 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 195 3, or they are
waived.
Fleming should not be denied the rescission of the contract
on the grounds of waiver, laches and estoppel.

POINT NO. IV
FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 7 AND 11 ARE REA·
SONABLY SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND LEND
SUPPORT TO THE JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION.
Defendants claim the Memorandum Decision deals ex·
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elusively with the invalidity of the contract. This is not so, for
on Page 3 it reads as follows:
"Without, this memorandum, going into the other
matters in the evidence, which confirm this same result,
it follows that the contract between the Felts and Fleming is wholly unilateral, inequitable and unenforceable by Fleming against the Felts and grants the Felts
complete power to dominate and terminate the contract
against Fleming." (R. 268).
Defendants have ignored the vital part of the by-laws passed
on May 23, 1955, and not on May 23, 1953, as set forth in
defendants' brief. The by-law which takes the duty of the
general manager from Fleming is Art. III, No. 2 (Exh. 2-P),
as follows:
"The president shall preside at all meetings of the
directors and stockholders and shall have full charge
of and control over the affairs of the corporation, subject
to the Board of Directors.''
No. 3 of Article 3 is as follows:
"The vice-president shall perform such duties as may
be assigned to him by the Board of Directors. In case
of death, disability or absence of the president, he
shall perform and be vested with all of the duties and
powers of the president."
This is contrary to the contract, and the by-laws could just
as easily have stated that the vice-president, who was Fleming,
was to have the general management and control instead of
the president. In view of the dispute between the parties at
the time the by-laws were passed, this appears to have been an
intentional transfer of the general management by the Board
of Directors.
33
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Article 3, No. 3, shows that the vice-president was not to
become vested with the duties of the general management and
control until the death of the president.
The corporation laws of the State of Utah, Section 162-21, do not require the president to have the general charge
and control of the corporate affairs subject to the Board of
Directors. It only requires that the "corporate powers of the
corporation shall be exercised by the Board of Directors ... "
The Felts' conduct, on May 23, 1955, the same day as the
by-laws were passed, as Directors of the company, in passing
a resolution rehiring Marie at $400.00 per month, was a direct
interference with Fleming's management of the business, contrary to defendants' claim that there was no interference by
the Felts pursuant to the by-laws.
Mrs. Felt, in outlining the duties of a general manager,
admitted Fleming had the authority as general manager to hire
and fire (R. 232, 233). Yet, the Board of Directors stepped
in and nullified this action which Fleming had taken to save
the company money (R. 75).
As to the resolution curtailing Fleming's authority to
issue checks, prior to May 23, 1955, Fleming had been exercising this right alone, so in passing the resolution it showed the
general pattern and intent of the Felts to strip Fleming of all
authority.
In view of the January, 1955, so-called Board of Directors
meeting, when Fleming was reduced to sales manager (R. 71)
and the Felts' interference with Fleming's attempts to assert
his right as general manager (R. 68, 69), the passing of the
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by-laws and resolution on May 23, 1955, was the final official
act divesting Fleming of his title of general manager and any
authority he may have had.
In setting up a new checking account, Fleming's only desire
was to be able to meet the obligations of the company in view
of the difficulties he had with the Felts (R. 73). There was
nothing dishonest about it. He did not anticipate using the funds
for his own purpose and did not so use them. Mrs. Felt testified that she did not know when the check was taken (R. 223).
She wished to infer that it was taken from the bottom of the
check book so she would not know about it. However, on crossexamination, she testified as follows:

Q. "But he told you on the day he wrote the check
that he had written it; is that correct?"
A. "Yes, he did that night after hours." (R. 230).
The check was drawn March 2, 1955, and returned to the
regular account according to Mrs. Felt's testimony on the
following day, March 3, 1955 (R. 231).
If the Felts had been concerned about the honesty of
Fleming they would not have waited until May 23, 1957, to
curtail his check-writing authority.
Appellants in their brief claim the changes proposed by
Fleming were all carried out. This is not substantiated by the
evidence. The only change really made of any substance at a
later date was a change in the office furniture (R. 67, 68).
As to Marie Felt's outline of the duties of general manager
and appellants' claim that none of them were interfered with,
she claimed that the general manager was responsible for
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making a profit, filling orders, namely delivery service, the
bookkeeping department (R. 221), and hiring and firing (R.
232). It is obvious from the foregoing argument that these
duties were interferred with as shown by the testimony, namely,
on price cutting on old merchandise (R. 69), on bookkeeping
(R. 68), rehiring Marie Felt after Fleming fired her to reduce
costs (R. 74, 75, Exh. 15-D, Page 9).
Although the duties of general maanger were not outlined,
the contract infers a broad delegation of authority with only a
reservation in the Board of Directors to step in when Fleming
failed to make a profit for two consecutive years (Exh. 1-P,
Paragraph 4). This would be in keeping with the Felts'
representation when the contract was signed that Fleming was
to have the management of the business.

I . .

The whole object of the contract had been defeated when
plaintiffs tenders were refused and as shown in Point No. 3,
•
there was no waiver of fraud and certainly no waiver of the ,~:
breach of May 23, 1955, and the breach of June 8, 1955, which
support the Decree of Rescission.

~·

Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 11 are supported by ample
evidence and they do support the judgment for rescission.

POINT NO. V

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A
MONEY JUDGMENT.
The following authorities indicate that a money judgment
is proper when property cannot be restored in specie:
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"The right to resctsston and restitution generally
exists as an alternative remedy to an action for damages
where there has been a repudiation or a material breach
of a contract and is most commonly exercised when
the aggrieved party has performed fully or in part and
wishes to recover what he has given or its value."
Williston on Contracts, Section 1455.
"In cases where acting in good faith, property has
been so changed or lost that it cannot be restored in
specie and where its value is capable of being ascertained, a party entitled to do so may rescind a contract
by tendering the pecuniary equivalent of the property
in question. 12 Am. Jur. Page 1034, Section 452.
It is evident that the original merchandise which Fleming
contributed was not available for a return to him. Fleming's
testimony was that his inventory had a fast turn-over and was
sold within approximately 3 months (R. 132). That when he
left the business on June 8, 1955, some of his merchandise
that had been replaced could have been remaining, but he
had no idea how much (R. 133).
Two and one-half years have elapsed since that time and
it was evident to the court that defendants could not restore
what plaintiff contributed in specie and it was impracticable
to decree a restoration of the property. Fleming was therefore
entitled to the value of his contribution, namely $13,512.00,
which was the valuation placed upon it at the time it was put
into the Fleming-Felt Company, and said value was admitted
in the contract (Exh. 1-P) and plaintiff testified as to its value
of $13,511.52 (R. 62). This was the only equitable means of
restoring the status quo.
The business had not lost money. Exh. 12-P was based upon
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an estimated inventory and was an arbitrary computation incompetent to show a loss as testified to by Owen Sumsion and
Fleming (R. 131, 191). Mr. Sumsion also testified that the
company was paying its obligations (R. 193) and the accounts
receivable were good accounts (R. 192).
Plaintiff was legally entitled to his earnings of $400.00
per month as previously argued. He couldn't be expected to
work for nothing and give the Felts the entire benefit from
his services. Fleming lost his business he built up in Provo,
Utah, and has had the problem of trying to build a new automotive parts business while his assets have been retained by
the defendants for the past 2Yz years. To require a return of
Fleming's salary would give defendants an unconscionable
advantage and reward them for their wrongful conduct.
To arrive at the inventory on June 8, 1955, the court would
have had to indulge in conjecture and estimate; there was no
proof of what it was. The proposed division of joint inventory
by appellants as of June 8, 1955, would be inequitable since
Fleming's uncontradicted testimony was that 80 per cent of
the business was done with his merchandise and Mr. King
testified that only 50 per cent of the inventory of J. H. Felt
Motor Supply Co. was readily marketable on September 1,
1953 (R. 133, 148).
Interest was properly allowed in restoring the status quo
as shown by the following citations:
In the annotation of 171 ALR at page 854, which deals
with the allowance of interest in actions for fraud, it clearly
appears that the vast majority of American jurisdictions allow
interest prior to judgment at the legal statutory rate ( 67c):
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"The broad principle that when interest by way of
damages is allowed, it is generally computed at the
legal statutory rate, is applicable to the recovery of
interest in actions based on fraud or duress. This conclusion is supported by the many decisions scattered
throughout the annotation, in which the court approves
the allowance of interest at a designated rate which,
although it is not expressly so denominated, is from the
context, clearly the statutory rate in the jurisdiction
in question. It is also expressly supported in some instances by the language used in the decision."
In the case of Kimball vs. Salt Lake City, 32 (Utah) 253
90 P. 395 at page 261 of its decision, the court stated:
" ... We have had occasion to pass upon the subject
of when interest is to be allowed on claims for unliquidated damages at this term in the case of Fell vs.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 88 P. 1003, and this case
clearly falls within the principles announced within
this case. In addition to the authorities there cited, the
following support respondents contention that interest
is to be allowed in this class of cases as a matter of legal
right ... "
In the case of Fell vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 32 Utah
101 88 P. 1003, the court set forth the principles pertaining to

the allowance of interest in cases like "the one at bar, although
the case was not one involving fraud. However, it clearly indicated that cases involving fraud should come within the scope
of its ruling.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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